

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/16: CIA-RDP87R00529R000300260001-3 25X1 TOP SECRET The Director of Central Intelligence Washington, D.C. 20505 25X1 National Intelligence Council 21 November 1985 MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence FROM: 25X1 Assistant National Intelligence Officer for Europe SUBJECT: Proposed Talking Points on Europe's Preliminary Reactions to the Summit 1. Official West European comments on the summit is still sparse, but some early reaction is guarded. French Foreign Minister Dumas, in an interview with Liberation, has urged greater European unity to establish an independent European "voice" in US Soviet dialogues. Italian Foreign Minister Adreotti also emphasized the same need--but through close consultation among the Allies. (He claimed the Europeans helped to arrange the Summit.) 2. The West European press in general fixes on the apparent cordiality between President Reagan and Soviet leader Gorbachev and the announcement of more summits as signs of serious efforts to improve East-West relations. French television reporters have stressed the favorable ambiance and atmosphere. The Swedish press has stated that the new East-West dialogue was possible because both Moscow and Washington feel strong and confident. The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung has maintained that even the most modest agreements must be viewed as a success. Copy No. 22 25X1 TOP SECRET

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3. Many overdrawn exp	•	
, 	A <u>London Times</u> editorial argues that the West could not expect more than an agreement to agree, and that in efforts to get along with the Soviet Union the West should not compromise its principles.	
	French commentators argue that basic differences between the superpowers make it impossible to expect many concrete results.	
	The Portuguese and Greek press argue that a spectacular summit outcome cannot be expected because of "US intransigence on SDI."	
	h public opinion polls taken on the eve of the summit and Le Monde demonstrate low popular expectations.	
	Sixty-six percent of those polled thought the outcome would not make a big difference in East-West relations.	
	A recent poll shows that positive attitudes on the Soviet Union continue to decline while views on the United States are improving. This indicates that Gorbachev's propangada initiatives have had little effect on French publics.	

- 5. <u>East European</u> media repeated Soviet descriptions of the discussion. In nuances, reporting from East Germany gave the most positive twist to prospects on disarmament and East-West relations.
 - -- They have said a "successful" summit would help in rescheduling the visit by Honecker to West Germany, possibly as soon as early December.
- 6. Warsaw maintained its anti-US invective despite private assurances recently that Warsaw wants improved relations.

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MEMORANDUM FOR:	Deputy Director of Central Intelligence	
FROM:	Dennis Bennett Assistant National Intelligence Officer for Europe	
SUBJECT:	Proposed Talking Points on Europe's Preliminary Reactions to the Summit	
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